The broad outlines of a Russia-Ukraine diplomatic settlement were tentatively reached by Zelensky and Putin in March-April 2022, less than 2 months after Russia's illegal invasion.1 The settlement under consideration wouldn't have involved any Russian acquisition of Ukrainian territory. Even so, the US and UK took numerous steps to undermine the negotiations. Biden and Johnson failed to provide security guarantees to Ukraine should a settlement be reached (rendering the prospect politically and personally suicidal for Zelensky), made military promises they could not keep, and pressured Ukraine to continue fighting to the bitter end. Their overriding interest was not to protect Ukraine or its territory, but to "fight Russia to the last Ukrainian" (Lindsey Graham) and "see Russia weakened" (Lloyd Austin). From the outset, the US regarded the war as “bigger than Russia” and “bigger than Ukraine.”
The results of this decision have been devastating. Months after the US and UK undermined efforts to end the conflict diplomatically, Putin expanded his war aims and declared his intention to annex large swaths of Eastern Ukraine. The US insisted for months that Ukraine's 2023 “counteroffensive” would overwhelm Russia's defenses and radically change the territorial equation. It didn't. The counteroffensive did minimal damage to Russian positions while heavily depleting Ukrainian troops and weaponry, enabling Russia to acquire larger and larger swaths of Ukrainian territory in the months that followed. Despite Biden/Harris assurances to the contrary, there is no basis whatsoever for believing this trend will be reversed. Russia has four times as many active-service military personnel as Ukraine, and comparably asymmetrical artillery advantages. At present, more Ukrainian land is taken and more Ukrainian lives are lost with each passing month. No positive progress is being made, but considerable negative progress is being made.
One could argue that Ukrainians have the right to defend their country to the bitter end, no matter how futile or counterproductive this may appear. Fair enough. But there are two problems with how this argument is deployed in US contexts. For one thing, the question of whether Ukrainians have the right to continue fighting is distinct from the question of whether the US should militarily support that fight. The latter question can’t be answered merely by appealing to the former. More importantly, this is a war that Ukrainians are being drafted into, often involuntarily, by a government that has indefinitely suspended democratic elections. Growing numbers of Ukrainian men are fleeing the draft, and polling indicates that the vast majority of them want not to be conscripted. In this situation, the question isn't whether Ukrainians have the right to take up arms against Russia, but whether the US should continue supporting a war effort that [1] is yielding nothing but monthly losses of Ukrainian land and life and [2] is motored by an increasingly unpopular and democratically unaccountable conscription program. That's the conversation that needs to be had, however painful and unjust the final outcome may be.
Early US/UK obstructionism helped to turn Russia's invasion from a three-month disaster into a years-long catastrophe. The onus is on the US and UK governments to accept this reality and do what can still be done to remedy it. Don't expect the Democrats to do so until at least November.
For historical background on the Ukraine conflict and Russia’s 2022 invasion, see Nicolai Petro’s The Tragedy of Ukraine and Richard Sakwa’s Frontline Ukraine.